Moral status of accidents

No one is naive enough to expect that all moral beliefs are universal. Today, some countries legally beat and imprison homosexuals, and others recognize gay marriage; in some places, killing a bull is a sport, and, in others, it is an abomination; in some places, corporal punishment is the obligation of a responsible parent and, in others, grounds for forced removal. Indeed, the burden of proof seems to be on the other side: Is there anything universal about human moral cognition? In PNAS, Barrett et al. (1) test one candidate for a universal principle of human morality: that an action’s moral value depends not only on the action’s consequences but on the person’s intentions

For Love or Money: A Common Neural Currency for Social and Monetary Reward

Two papers in the current issue of Neuron (Izuma et al. and Zink et al.) report that activity in specific regions of the brain, especially the striatum, reflects a common signal of reward in both the economic (e.g., money) and social (e.g., praise and status) domains

The Power of Being Heard: The Benefits of \u27Perspective-Giving\u27 in the Context of Intergroup Conflict

Although hundreds of dialogue programs geared towards conflict resolution are offered every year, there have been few scientific studies of their effectiveness. Across 2 studies we examined the effect of controlled, dyadic interactions on attitudes towards the ‘other’ in members of groups involved in ideological conflict. Study 1 involved Mexican immigrants and White Americans in Arizona, and Study 2 involved Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Cross-group dyads interacted via video and text in a brief, structured, face-to-face exchange: one person was assigned to write about the difficulties of life in their society (‘perspective-giving’), and the second person was assigned to accurately summarize the statement of the first person (‘perspective-taking’). Positive changes in attitudes towards the outgroup were greater for Mexican immigrants and Palestinians after perspective-giving and for White Americans and Israelis after perspective-taking. For Palestinians, perspective-giving to an Israeli effectively changed attitudes towards Israelis, while a control condition in which they wrote an essay on the same topic without interacting had no effect on attitudes, illustrating the critical role of being heard. Thus, the effects of dialogue for conflict resolution depend on an interaction between dialogue condition and participants\u27 group membership, which may reflect power asymmetries

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others’ goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind

Continuity in the neural system supporting children's theory of mind development: Longitudinal links between task-independent EEG and task-dependent fMRI.

Children's explicit theory of mind (ToM) understandings change over early childhood. We examined whether there is longitudinal stability in the neurobiological bases of ToM across this time period. A previous study found that source-localized resting EEG alpha attributable to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) was associated with children's performance on a battery of theory of mind tasks. Here, we investigated a small subset of children (N = 12) in that original study as a preliminary investigation of whether behavioral measures of ToM performance, and/or EEG localized to the DMPFC or RTPJ predicted ToM-specific fMRI responses 3.5 years later. Results showed that preschoolers' behavioral ToM-performance positively predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Preschoolers' resting EEG attributable to the DMPFC also predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Given the small sample, results represent a first exploration and require replication. Intriguingly, they suggest that early maturation of the area of the DMPFC related to ToM reasoning is positively linked with its specific recruitment for ToM reasoning later in development, affording implications for characterizing conceptual ToM development, and its underlying neural supports

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others' goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 0645960)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 095518)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1

A Common Neural Code for Perceived and Inferred Emotion

Although the emotions of other people can often be perceived from overt reactions (e.g., facial or vocal expressions), they can also be inferred from situational information in the absence of observable expressions. How does the human brain make use of these diverse forms of evidence to generate a common representation of a target's emotional state? In the present research, we identify neural patterns that correspond to emotions inferred from contextual information and find that these patterns generalize across different cues from which an emotion can be attributed. Specifically, we use functional neuroimaging to measure neural responses to dynamic facial expressions with positive and negative valence and to short animations in which the valence of a character's emotion could be identified only from the situation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we test for regions that contain information about the target's emotional state, identifying representations specific to a single stimulus type and representations that generalize across stimulus types. In regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a classifier trained to discriminate emotional valence for one stimulus (e.g., animated situations) could successfully discriminate valence for the remaining stimulus (e.g., facial expressions), indicating a representation of valence that abstracts away from perceptual features and generalizes across different forms of evidence. Moreover, in a subregion of MPFC, this neural representation generalized to trials involving subjectively experienced emotional events, suggesting partial overlap in neural responses to attributed and experienced emotions. These data provide a step toward understanding how the brain transforms stimulus-bound inputs into abstract representations of emotion.National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1

Empathic Control through Coordinated Interaction of Amygdala, Theory of Mind and Extended Pain Matrix Brain Regions

Brain regions in the “pain matrix”, can be activated by observing or reading about others in physical pain. In previous research, we found that reading stories about others\u27 emotional suffering, by contrast, recruits a different group of brain regions mostly associated with thinking about others\u27 minds. In the current study, we examined the neural circuits responsible for deliberately regulating empathic responses to others\u27 pain and suffering. In Study 1, a sample of college-aged participants (n = 18) read stories about physically painful and emotionally distressing events during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), while either actively empathizing with the main character or trying to remain objective. In Study 2, the same experiment was performed with professional social workers, who are chronically exposed to human suffering (n = 21). Across both studies activity in the amygdala was associated with empathic regulation towards others\u27 emotional pain, but not their physical pain. In addition, psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis and Granger causal modeling (GCM) showed that amygdala activity while reading about others\u27 emotional pain was preceded by and positively coupled with activity in the theory of mind brain regions, and followed by and negatively coupled with activity in regions associated with physical pain and bodily sensations. Previous work has shown that the amygdala is critically involved in the deliberate control of self-focused distress — the current results extend the central importance of amygdala activity to the control of other-focused empathy, but only when considering others\u27 emotional pain